Voluntary work and labour income by Bruno, Bruna & Fiorillo, Damiano
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Voluntary work and labour income
Bruna Bruno and Damiano Fiorillo
University of Naples ”Parthenope”
25 January 2013
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/43995/
MPRA Paper No. 43995, posted 26 January 2013 15:10 UTC
1 
 
 
Voluntary work and labour income  
 
 
 
Bruna Bruno°, Damiano Fiorillo* 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The paper studies the effect of voluntary work on labour income for Italian employees. The 
Heckman and Instrumental Variables methods are used in order to control for self-selection bias of 
participation in labour market and endogeneity of volunteering. The results show that a wage 
premium of 3 - 4 percent of annual income emerges, when selection and endogeneity problems are 
taken into account 
 
 
Keywords: voluntary work, labour income, instrumental variables 
JEL Classification C36, J31 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
° Department of Economics and Statistics, University of Salerno, via Ponte don Melillo, 84084 Fisciano, 
Salerno, Italy. (brbruna@unisa.it) 
* (Corresponding author) Department of Economic Studies “Salvatore Vinci”, University of Naples 
“Parthenope”, Via Medina 40, 80133 Napoli. Tel. +39 081 5474942. Fax +39 0815474750. 
(damiano.fiorillo@uniparthenope.it) 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
1. Introduction       
Volunteering attracted economists’ attention mostly because it proves the existence of 
behaviours that do not respond only to economic incentives. Attempts to explain volunteers’ 
choices in the classical optimization framework recognize two fundamental motives for 
volunteering: a consumption motive, stressing that ‘helping others’ is a value for itself, pursued for 
intrinsic or social motivations (self determination and self respect, reputation, adherence to social 
norms); an investment motive, where unpaid or volunteering activities are performed to gain higher 
future remunerations. Economic models and empirical tests alternatively give prominence to the 
consumption or to the investment hypothesis (Andreoni 1990; Menchik and Weisbrod 1987). An 
attempt to reconcile both motivations to volunteering in a unique theoretical framework is in Bruno 
and Fiorillo (2012), where the simultaneous effect of consumption and investment motives is 
empirically tested. Results show that both motives interact in shaping regular unpaid labour supply, 
with a stronger impact of consumption motives and a little influence of investment motives. 
The consumption motives is typically tested through correlation between voluntary activities and 
proxies of intrinsic or social motivation. On the other hand, the existence of investment motives can 
be supported by evidence on the correlation between volunteering and higher wages: volunteers use 
their available time to invest in future higher wages.  
The wage premium for volunteering can be analyzed by answering three different questions: the 
first is about the existence of a wage premium, the second concerns its size and the third 
investigates why volunteering determines higher wages. The answer to each question entails 
addressing some theoretical and empirical problems, which have been variously considered in 
previous studies. 
The existence of a wage premium has to be proved taking into account the potential endogeneity 
of volunteering. As stated by Day and Devlin (1998, 1184) “Such simultaneity may arise via two 
channels: first, the wage differential between volunteers and non-volunteers (if it exists) may itself 
motivate individuals to volunteer; and second, if volunteering is a normal good, then individuals 
with higher incomes may be more likely to volunteer”. In the few empirical existing studies, only 
Hackl et al. (2008) control for potential endogeneity of volunteering. 
The size of the wage premium is important to assess the relevance of the investment motives in 
volunteering. Unfortunately, empirical analyses prove a wage premium ranging from 7 to 18,5 
percent. Day and Devlin (1997) find a significant positive wage premium for male volunteers about 
11 percent but not for women. Using the same data set, Day and Devlin (1998) show that, on 
average, volunteers earn about 7 percent higher incomes than non-volunteers. Prouteau and Wolff 
(2006), do not prove a statistically wage premium for volunteers in the public sector. Finally, Hackl 
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et al. (2008) using Austrian data show that, on average, the wage premium for volunteers amount up 
to 18.5 percent. The wide range of values suggests that a selectivity bias related to the labour force 
participation may be important (Day and Devlin 1997): the wage premium could disappear or be 
reduced as one controls for selectivity bias, but none of the previous studies consider the selectivity 
bias related to the labour force. Other biases can influence the wage premium size, if the sample is 
restricted to solve problems with data availability. Moreover, in all studies, except Prouteau and 
Wolff (2006), the income data are not in the ideal form. Income is available on household basis and 
in ranges rather than levels. The sample is therefore restricted to households in which the 
respondent is the sole wage earner, assigning the midpoint of his/her net household income as 
value.  
The third answer on wage premium for volunteering should explain why, if a wage premium 
exists, volunteers gain a higher income in the labour market. Three channels through which 
volunteering may affect earnings have been suggested (Day and Devlin 1997, 707-708).  
First, voluntary work may provide individuals with an alternative means of acquiring skills and 
experience that make them more productive (the human capital hypothesis). An accurate test of the 
human capital hypothesis should include as regressors the experience in volunteer activities and the 
experience in the labour market. Only in Day and Devlin (1998), data on volunteering experience is 
available, whereas labour experience is also in Hackl et al (2007).  The second channel of influence 
of volunteering on income underlines that volunteering may provide a signal to employers of 
otherwise unobservable ability (the screening hypothesis). If the wage premium is associated to 
unobservable characteristics, it should emerge also when a wide set of individual and labour market 
variables is employed. An overestimation of the size of the premium can emerge when employing 
parsimonious sets of regressors. Through the third channel volunteering may provide access to 
informal networks of contacts that can be useful in job search strategies (the networking hypothesis). 
Previous studies show mixed evidence on the relevance of this channel.  
This paper tries to answer to the three questions about wage premium for volunteers using a 
sample of Italian employees from the 2006 European Union Statistics on Income and Living 
Conditions (EU-SILC) dataset. The existence of a wage premium is tested employing the 
instrumental variable method to account for the causality of the correlation between voluntary work 
and income. To prevent overestimation of the size of the wage premium, we take into account the 
selectivity bias related to the labour force participation. The availability of information about 
earnings for each worker of the sample allows an analysis that is not restricted to single-earner 
households. Finally, a discussion on the three channels of influence of volunteering on wages is 
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conducted, considering the role of a wide set of variables, including working experiences, and using 
participation in organizations as instrumental variables.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 surveys previous empirical studies 
while Section 3 presents the empirical strategy used in this paper to analyze the effect of voluntary 
work on labour income. The data and the variables are presented in Section 4. Empirical results are 
shown in Section 5 and discussed in Section 6. Section 7 concludes. 
2. Literature review 
In economic literature empirical studies on the impact of voluntary work on earnings are 
relatively scarce. Since the seminal papers of Day and Devlin (1997, 1998), only a small number of 
studies have analyzed the phenomenon, because of the absence of data set suitable for testing the 
hypotheses. Most empirical studies prove a wage premium.  
Using a Survey of Volunteer Activity conducted by Statistics Canada, Day and Devlin (1997) 
examine whether returns to voluntary work in the paid labour market can explain part of the male-
female earnings gap. They find a significant positive wage premium for male volunteers about 11 
percent but not for women. The decomposition of earnings differential between volunteers and non-
volunteers shows that the differential is mainly attributable to differences in individual 
characteristics, both for males and females, in particular because volunteers are better educated than 
non-volunteers. This evidence indirectly supports the screening hypothesis. As to the additional 
returns to individual characteristics, mixed evidence emerges for males and females. For males, 
wage premium for volunteering is not an additional return of the previous characteristics, because it 
is for a great part unexplained. Because education is included in the individual characteristics, this 
evidence is not in favour of the human capital hypothesis. For females, much of the wage premium 
for volunteering is associated to a higher return to volunteering experience: volunteers with past 
experiences in volunteer activities are rewarded with an additional return to their experience in 
comparison to non-volunteers with the same past experience in volunteer activities. Also this 
puzzling evidence doesn’t support the human capital hypothesis, if past experience in volunteer 
activities represents an investment in acquiring skills both for volunteers and non-volunteers. It 
could be reasonable that a ‘motivational’ premium is associated to those who constantly persevere 
in the volunteer activities. 
  Using the same data set, Day and Devlin (1998) test directly the human capital hypothesis, by 
considering three alternative measure of volunteering accounting for past and current volunteering. 
Unfortunately, the experience in volunteering gives no further information on the human capital 
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accumulation and their “empirical model is not capable of discriminating between… competing 
explanations” (p. 1190). However, they show that, on average, volunteers earn about 7 percent 
higher incomes than non-volunteers.  
Prouteau and Wolff (2006) employ a switching regression model on a French survey to control 
for selectivity bias in the wage equation. Their analysis includes only those who take on 
responsibilities in associations, but all types of associations are considered (from recreational to 
professional), leading to mixed evidence on wage premium: results do not prove a wage premium 
for volunteers in the public sector, whereas in private sector they find a negative premium. On these 
results they reject the investment motive for volunteering, claiming that only consumption motives 
lead individuals to engage in voluntary activities. But the absence of wage premium can be also the 
result of some limitations of their analysis. A wide range of associations is considered and therefore 
also associations with explicitly leisure purposes, as a golf or tennis club, are included. Authors 
argument that by focusing only on participants with managerial tasks they implicitly limit the 
analysis to genuine volunteers, because French law prohibits compensations for these activities in 
associations, other than reimbursements of expenses. The argument is not fully convincing for three 
reasons. First, compensation can be hided under the label of reimbursements or other benefits and 
therefore many individuals observed may not to be unpaid volunteers. Second, the managerial 
position in the association can be the output and not the input of the networking activity, if it 
concerns a working career that is still at its maximum wage and needs different benefits in terms of 
prestige or social consideration to exploit1. Though it is difficult to think of the president or of the 
treasurer of a golf club as a volunteer, they probably are engaged in networking activities, with 
investment purposes, oriented toward social prestige and not toward higher wages. This intuition is 
indirectly confirmed by the same authors when they find a positive effect of managerial 
responsibilities in associations on the number of gatherings with friends, which they explain as a 
relational (consumption) motive for volunteering, but that could be also a networking (investment) 
motive. Therefore, when focusing on these ‘volunteer managers’ the wage premium disappears. 
Third, and probably more important, when selecting a subsample of individuals a careful analysis 
should verify the existence of a selection bias: have the association managers self selected 
themselves in that status? It could be that the associations’ managers have a weaker investment 
motive, for unobservable characteristics, compared to the other association members, and just for 
these characteristics they are selected for the position. 
                                                           
1
 In the descriptive statistics, a half of associations managers are in the 40-50 age class, which is usually a peak in the 
wage profile. 
6 
 
 Finally, Hackl et al. (2008), using Austrian data, show that on average the wage premium for 
volunteers amounts up to 18.5 percent. Their analysis is devoted to find support to the investment 
model, with the advantage of multiple dimensions employed to measure volunteering (the 
dichotomous variable, the numbers of hours individuals volunteer and the number of organizations 
they are engaged in). These multiple dimensions allow testing different hypotheses of behaviour 
and considering at once the three channels of influence of volunteering on earnings. Results show 
that numbers of volunteering hours plays an important role in explaining the wage premium, and 
this evidence is called to confirm the three hypotheses because more hours of volunteering have 
three effects: allow useful exercise to accumulate human capital, might intensify social contacts 
within the network, and signal the individual’s willingness to perform.  Note that self-selection of 
volunteers is confirmed in the analysis, strengthening the screening hypothesis, whereas the number 
of organizations one is engaged in has no significant impact on wages, weakening the networking 
hypothesis.    
Summing up, the few studies concerning wage premium for volunteering give some support to 
the existence of an investment return to volunteering. When it is proved, the return to volunteering 
ranges from 7 percent to 18,5 percent, but it is difficult to discern which channel conduces to the 
investment return: evidence tends to support the screening hypothesis and to reject the human 
capital hypothesis. 
3. Empirical strategy 
In determining the effect of voluntary work on earnings the basic model to be estimated can be 
written as follows: 
ln Wi = X1iβ1 + α1Vi + µ1i                        (1) 
where Wi denotes the individual wage, X1i is a vector of exogenous individual characteristics that 
are thought to determine earnings, Vi is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the individual 
supplies voluntary work, and 0 otherwise. β1 and α1 and are parameters to be estimated while µ1i is a 
random error term.  
As indicated above, the model may suffer from a type of sample selection problem as it ignores 
the potential bias introduced by the individual’s decision to participate in the labour force. Working 
individuals may not be a random sub-sample of the population as they may have systematically 
different characteristics from those without a paid job. These characteristics may exercise an 
influence not only on the choice to work but also on volunteering and earnings, involving that the 
labour force participation and volunteering decisions need to be considered when modelling an 
 individual’s attainment in the labour market. 
volunteers are individuals with above average ability, they will tend to have higher wages 
regardless of whether they have acquired any useful skills or contacts through volunteering, and 
thus volunteers’ wages may be higher than those of non
individuals are more likely to volunteer (Day and 
In this paper a double methodological approach is used to estimate the effect of 
on earnings. First, a self-selection framework 
correct for potential sample selection bias. 
employed to account for the endogeneity bias when estimating the effect of 
labour income. 
We first start with Heckman techniques. The model consists of 
participation equation and a labour 
Suppose that  is the continuous latent variable associated with the work decision. This can be 
expressed as 
where X2i is a vector containing individual characteristics that influence the decision to enter the 
labour market, β2 is a vector of parameters to be estimated and 
the wage market exceeds the reservation wage,
individual doesn’t work.  is unobservable but 
takes the value of 1 if the individual works and 0 if the individual does not work.     
 
Considering the potential bias rel
the wage model can be rewritten as
ln W
where β3, α2 and γ1 are parameters to be estimated, 
Ф(X2iβ2) is the inverse Mills ratio for labour force participation equation where 
probability distribution and Ф(.) is the normal cumulative distribution.  
The voluntary work equation is 
Moreover, voluntary work may be end
-volunteers simply because higher
Devlin 1998, 720). 
of labour market participation is employed in order to 
Second, the Instrumental Variable (IV)
two equations: a labour force 
income equation. 
     = X2iβ2 + µ2i                               (2) 
µ2i is a random 
 and the individual chooses to work. If 
depends on the observable binary variable 
 =  
 
ated to the individual decision to participate in
 
i = X1iβ3 + α2Vi + γ1λ1i+µ3i                        (3) 
µ3i, is a random error term and 
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ogenous. If 
-income 
voluntary work 
 technique is 
voluntary work on 
error term. If  > 0, 
 ≤ 0, 
, that 
 
 the labour force, 
λ1i = ϕ(X2iβ2))/ 
ϕ(.) is the normal 
          
Where  is the latent variable describing the ut
containing individual characteristics that influence the decision to supply unpaid work, 
of parameters to be estimated and 
observable dichotomous variable, 
and 0 otherwise.  
 
The IV technique is a two-step process. The first stage consists in generating the predict
probability for voluntary work by estimating Eq.
predicted probability is used to replace 
least-squares (OLS).  
4. Data 
The data for this study come from the European Union Statistics on Income and Living 
Conditions (EU-SILC) dataset. The EU
longitudinal multidimensional data on income, social exclusion and living conditions perfor
Member States (MS) of the European Community. The reference population of EU
private households and their current heads residing in the territory of the MS at the time of data 
collection. The EU-SILC data is thus a national representativ
over residing in private households within the country. Four types of data are gathered in EU
1) variables measured at the household level; 2) information on household size and composition and 
basic characteristics of household heads; 3) income and other more complex variables measured at 
the personal level, but aggregated to construct household
the personal level. The items included in the micro data regards health, educati
housing, demographic and employment characteristics, income.
The paper uses 2006 wave of EU
characteristics of individuals as well as their 
participation is self-assessed by the individual who 
in contact with friends and relatives; ii) participation in informal and formal voluntary activities; iii) 
participation in cultural events. 
 = X3iβ4 + µ4i                                                    (4) 
ility gain from volunteering, 
µ4i is a random error term.  is unobservable but 
, that takes the value of 1 if the individual does voluntary work 
 =  
 
 (4) using a probit model. In the second stage, the 
 variable in Eq. (3) and the model is estimates by 
-SILC database provides comparable, cross sectional and 
e sample of all person aged 16 and 
-level variables; 4) variables collected at 
 
-SILC, which provides information on the labour market 
social participation. The information on social
is asked to report i) frequency of getting/being 
8 
X3i is a vector 
β4 is a vector 
linked to the 
ed 
ordinary 
med in 
-SILC is all 
-SILC: 
on, childcare, 
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Our attention is restricted to employees who supply voluntary work in formal organizations. The 
original sample contains 46522 observations.  After excluding individuals who were not employees, 
we were left with a subsample of 15169 employees, of whom 1239 were volunteers and 13930 were 
non-volunteers, who were aged between 16 and 64 in 2006. All the variables used in the analysis 
are described in detail in Appendix A. Weighted summary statistics are reported in Table 1. 
The dependent variable of the wage equation is the natural logarithm of employee income 
(py010n). Employee income is defined as the total remuneration, in cash, payable by an employer to 
an employee in return for work done by the latter during the reference period. The survey reports 
after-tax income and no information on the different tax rates. 
The micro data contains a question, ps150, in which the individual reports if he/she, during the 
last twelve months, participated in the unpaid work of charitable organizations, groups or clubs. The 
voluntary work dummy takes the values of 1 if the worker participated in the unpaid work of 
charitable organizations, groups or clubs and 0 otherwise. The voluntary work dummy includes 
only respondents who supply unpaid work, and doesn’t include other organisation members who do 
not perform unpaid work. As in previous studies, the data do not provide any information on the 
number of hours that the individual spent in formal voluntary activities.  
A convincing analysis requires that at least one variable in equations (2) and (4) is excluded from 
wage equation (3).  
In order to find instruments for the voluntary work equation, the following questions are used: if 
the respondent, during the last twelve months, i) participated in activities of religious organizations 
(activities related to churches, religious communions or associations) or other groups 
(environmental organizations, civil right groups, neighbourhood associations, peace groups, 
etc…)(Religious or other groups participation); 2  ii) undertook (private) every week voluntary 
activities to help someone, such as cooking for others; taking care of people in hospitals/at home; 
taking people for a walk (Informal Help). The dummy variables are set to 1 if the individuals 
responded “yes”.  
While it seems reasonable that these variables increase the likelihood to supply voluntary work 
in formal organizations, it is not obvious that they have no effect on earnings. Instrumental 
variables should satisfy two conditions: highly significant correlation with voluntary work (strength 
of the instrument) and no correlation with the error term in the structural equation (validity 
condition). A number of tests can be run in order to check the strength and indirect validity of the 
instrumental variables used for voluntary work and we will present them in the empirical results. 
                                                           
2
 The variable includes respondents who participated to religious associations “or” to other groups (environmental 
organizations, civil right groups, neighborhood associations, peace groups etc). In the variable construction have been 
excluded respondents participating at least to one of the two categories (religious and other groups).  
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The second requirement for reliable instrumental variables cannot be tested directly as it involves a 
relationship between instruments and the error term. Hence, we rely on the following theoretical 
considerations and intuitions.  
The first variable, religious or other groups participation dummy, concerns participation in 
various organizations. Membership and participation in these kinds of associations can promote 
coordination and civic culture, and it is reasonable to argue that these behaviours affect the 
probability of engaging in voluntary activities. Furthermore, persons attending relational networks 
are socially integrated and are more likely to hear about volunteer opportunities or meet other 
volunteers (Wilson, 2012). Nevertheless, it seems arguable that the extensive field of interest of 
these organizations avoids skill complementarities between members that can be useful for labour 
market outcomes. The same may not be true for political or professional associations or unions: 
membership in a professional association or union is strictly linked to working status and earning 
function, the same being true for people attending the meetings of political parties that may be 
motivated by lobby interests.  
Religion deserves further considerations. Existing analyses on religion and income concern both 
the effect of religion on income and the inverse relationship. Theoretical explanations involve 
beliefs, opportunity cost of time and network effects. Most studies focus on the differences effect 
between denominations (Jewish, Catholic, Protestant, etc…), whereas other studies analyse church 
membership. The results are positive for the Jewish beliefs and mixed for other denominations and 
for church attendance (Bettendorf and Dijkgraaf 2011). Tomes (1985) shows earning differentials 
by religion, attributable to different returns to human capital. The higher return to human capital is 
generated in stronger family backgrounds in terms of values, skills and goals. The same family 
impact is found in Steen (2004) especially for Catholics and Jews. Note that both analyses are 
focused on the different impact of religious attitudes (and family’s religion) and not of the choice to 
be religious or not, that is church attendance and/or the participation to religious association when 
one is adult. It seems that is more important the family training than the individual choice for a 
religious participation: Cornelissen and Jirjahn (2012) show that “people who are raised religiously 
and reject religion as adults are economically more successful as they combine a strong internalized 
work ethic with an increased interest in present consumption (as opposed to afterlife consumption)”. 
Regarding the inverse relationship, Sawkins et al. (1997) find a positive relationship between labour 
income and church attendance using micro-data for Great Britain. However, as suggested by 
Lepford and Tollison (2003), there might be a bicausal relation between religion and income when 
one would consider the endogeneity of religion. Lepford and Tollison using macro-data on US in a 
system of equations find that the effect of church membership on income is negative as well as the 
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effect of income on church membership, whereas Bettendorf and Dijkgraaf (2011), using micro-
data for Netherlands show that the cross-effects between income and church attendance get 
insignificant in a joint regression model. 
Summing up, previous studies on religion and income focus on different denominations and 
church attendance, and show mixed findings. Our variable of religious participation includes both 
church attendance and other activities related to churches, religious communions or associations. 
Being a wider concept of participation to religious associations, we are confident that our variable 
of “religious participation” is uncorrelated with income, based on the following considerations. 
First of all, the wider definition of religious participation better captures the networking effects 
of associational participation above discussed for all the organizations considered. The argument of 
absence of skill complementarities still holds. 
Second, religious participation as church attendance signals an individual preference for afterlife 
consumption: this implies that religious participants place a relatively lower valuation on market 
earnings (Lipford and Tollison, 2003), which is confirmed in the joint regression model of 
Bettendorf and Dijkgraaf (2011). 
Finally, the family training effects, which are variable among religions, should be less important 
in Italy where Catholic religion is surely prevalent. If family training effects exist, they should be 
uniform and eventually captured by the educational variables, through background effects.   
The second instrumental variable concerns the informal help variable as cooking, walking and 
being with others. It seems reasonable that intrinsic motivation that incentives to volunteering 
(Bruno, Fiorillo, 2012), encourages also to these informal help activities. This argument is 
supported by Hank and Stuck (2007) results, showing a complementary and interdependent 
relationship between volunteering, helping, and caring, supporting notions of the existence of a 
motivation for engagement. On the other hand, activities of informal help do not require expensive 
material goods to be carried out, and the relationship with income availability can be ignored. The 
opportunity cost of time used to accomplish these tasks is equally irrelevant, because the frequency 
requested is a weekly effort for very easy tasks. 
In order to identify the exclusion variables for the labour force participation equation, we use 
three dummy variables: if the respondent, during the last twelve months, perceived a social pension, 
a disability pension and a civil disability pension. In a standard labour supply model, these income-
support schemes discourage labour force participation and are not included in labour income.  
A number of variables are included in the wage equation. These variables are standard in 
empirical applications of the human capital model: demographic characteristics (gender, marital 
status, age, education, family size, number of children, health, homeownership), working 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 
 
 
 
                  All sample                                           Volunteers                                     Non volunteers 
Variable           Mean        Std. Dev.          Mean        Std. Dev.      Mean     Std. Dev. 
Voluntary activities 0.08 0.26     
Labour income (ln) 9.61 0.59 9.73 0.59 9.60 0.59 
Male 0.57 0.49 0.54 0.50 0.57 0.49 
Married            0.59 0.49 0.59 0.49 0.60 4.49 
Separated 0.02 0.16 0.03 0.18 0.02 0.15 
Divorced 0.03 0.16              0.02 0.15 0.03 0.16 
Widowed 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.12 
Age 40.0 10.41 41.76 10.20 39.85 10.41 
Low secondary edu 0.31 0.46 0.21 0.41 0.32 0.47 
Upper secondary edu 0.37 0.48 0.37 0.48 0.37 0.48 
Post secondary edu 0.08 0.27 0.11 0.31 0.08 0.27 
University edu 0.16 0.37 0.27 0.45 0.15 0.36 
Household size 3.14 1.22 3.01 1.19 3.15 1.23 
Children 0 - 2 0.09 0.31 0.05 0.24 0.10 0.31 
Children 3 - 5 0.10 0.31 0.08 0.29 0.10 0.31 
Children 6 - 15  0.35 0.63 0.35 0.63 0.35 0.63 
Children 16 - 24 0.40 0.69 0.39 0.65 0.41 0.70 
Good health 0.74 0.44 0.71 0.45 0.74 0.43 
Homeowner 0.71 0.45 0.79 0.41 0.70 0.46 
Weakly hours 37.77 8.70 36.95 8.96 37.84 8.67 
Labour experience 16.08 10.27 17.64 10.50 15.95 10.24 
Permanent contract 0.84 0.36 0.87 0.33 0.84 0.36 
Firm size       
> 10 and < 20 employees 0.15 0.36 0.15 0.35 0.15 0.36 
> 19 and < 50 employees 0.14 0.35      0.17   0.37 0.14 0.35 
0.> 49 employees  0.35 0.47 0.44 0.50 0.34 0.47 
Job-Professional 0.33 0.47 0.48 0.50 0.32 0.47 
Job-Skilled 0.30 0.46 0.27 0.44 0.30 0.46 
Agriculture 0.03 0.18 0.01 0.12 0.04 0.19 
Construction 0.07 0.25 0.03 0.16 0.07 0.26 
Wholesale 0.10 0.30 0.06 0.24 0.11 0.31 
Hotels 0.03 0.17 0.02 0.14 0.03 0.17 
Transport 0.05 0.23 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.23 
Finance 0.03 0.18 0.04 0.19 0.03 0.18 
Real estate 0.06 0.23 0.02 0.16 0.06 0.23 
Education 0.09 0.29 0.16 0.37 0.08 0.28 
Public administration 0.10 0.30 0.11 0.32 0.10 0.30 
Health and social work 0.08 0.27 0.16 0.36 0.07 0.26 
Other sectors 0.08 0.28 0.09 0.29 0.08 0.28 
Densely populated area 0.44 0.50 0.41 0.49 0.44 0.50 
Intermediate area 0.39 0.49 0.39 0.49 0.39 0.49 
North East  0.22 0.41 0.27 0.45 0.21 0.41 
Centre 0.20 0.40 0.19 0.39 0.20 0.40 
South 0.19 0.39 0.17 0.37 0.19 0.39 
Islands 0.09 0.29 0.07 0.25 0.09 0.29 
Observation          15169               1239                         13930 
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characteristics (weekly hours, experience, permanent job), firm size, occupation, sector of activity 
and territorial dummies. 
In the all sample the proportion of working individuals who supply voluntary work in formal 
organizations is 8%. Table 1 reports characteristics of volunteers and non-volunteers. Volunteers, 
on average, are older, have higher high school degree, more labour market experience, are 
employed in professional occupations and in large firms, are employed in public sector and live in 
the north. Finally, it should be also noted that the average labour income (in log) for volunteers is 
higher than non-volunteers, i.e. 9.73 and 9.60, respectively. 
5. Empirical results 
Table 2 presents the OLS results of the wage function (equation 1). In Column (1) we present a 
specification that includes the voluntary work dummy variable and some control variables: gender, 
marital status, age, education (two dummies), family size, number of children, health, homeowner, 
weekly hours, experience, permanent job, municipal dummies. The coefficient on the volunteering 
variable is statistically significant (5%) and indicates that the wage premium associated with 
voluntary work is 2.9 percent. This finding is of limited use given the lack of other relevant 
independent variables. However, it can be compared with the result of Hackl et al. (2007, 88). 
Using a parsimonious specification Hackl and co-authors, with Austrian data, find that in 2001 the 
wage premium for volunteers amounted to 23,6 percent. These figures seem to suggest that the 
return to volunteering is significantly lower. Other education dummy variables are added in Column 
(2). The coefficient on the voluntary work dummy variable is no longer statistically significant and 
its value is lower than the corresponding value in Column (1). The rate of return to voluntary work 
disappears when we control for all education dummy variables. A number of job characteristics and 
territorial dummy variables are included in Column (3). The coefficient on volunteering is still not 
statistically significant and presents a negative sign. Hence, in the wide specification as in Day and 
Devlin (1998) we do not find a wage premium for voluntary work supplied in formal organizations.  
The empirically findings on the other independent variables are generally consistent with 
previous studied. The labour income of males is higher than that of females and married employees 
have higher wage than single workers. The effect of education on labour income is in line with the 
expectations: the higher is the educational level, the higher is the income level of an employee. The 
larger is the number of hours worked per week, the higher is labour income. These results are in line 
with findings of Day and Devlin (1998). Moreover, as in Hackl et al. (2007), the greater is the 
labour experience on paid work, the higher is wage.   
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Table 2. Ordinary least-squares estimates of the effect of volunteering on labour income 
Note. The symbols ***, **, * denote coefficient  statistically different from zero at the 1, 5 and 10 percent. 
               (1)                (2)                  (3)  
 Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff.  SE 
Voluntary work 0.029** 0.015 0.009 0.015 -0.012 0.014 
Male 0.206*** 0.009 0.203*** 0.009  0.200*** 0.009 
Married 0.055*** 0.010 0.058*** 0.010  0.052*** 0.010 
Separated 0.059** 0.029 0.056* 0.029  0.040 0.028 
Divorced 0.051** 0.023 0.046** 0.023  0.040* 0.022 
Widowed 0.023 0.029 0.040 0.028  0.041 0.026 
Age 0.010*** 0.001 0.009*** 0.001  0.009*** 0.001 
Low secondary edu -0.099*** 0.012 0.166*** 0.019  0.115*** 0.018 
Upper secondary edu -0.025*** 0.010 0.279*** 0.020  0.193*** 0.018 
Post secondary edu   0.286*** 0.022  0.186*** 0.021 
University edu   0.477*** 0.023  0.347*** 0.022 
Household size -0.022*** 0.004 -0.018*** 0.004 -0.012*** 0.004 
Children 0 - 2  0.069*** 0.013 0.056*** 0.013  0.040*** 0.012 
Children 3 - 5  0.064*** 0.012 0.061*** 0.012  0.056*** 0.011 
Children 6 - 15   0.047*** 0.007 0.041*** 0.007  0.038*** 0.007 
Children 16 - 24 -0.019*** 0.008 -0.019*** 0.007 -0.014** 0.007 
Good health  0.046*** 0.009 0.034*** 0.009  0.035*** 0.008 
Homeowner  0.095*** 0.009 0.079*** 0.009  0.058*** 0.009 
Weakly hours 0.017*** 0.001 0.017*** 0.001  0.017*** 0.001 
Labour experience 0.004*** 0.001 0.007*** 0.001  0.005*** 0.001 
Permanent contract 0.416*** 0.016 0.399*** 0.016  0.343*** 0.016 
Firm size       
> 10 and < 20 employees      0.070*** 0.011 
> 19 and < 50 employees      0.134*** 0.012 
.> 49 employees       0.167*** 0.010 
Job-Professional 0.320*** 0.011 0.292*** 0.011  0.208*** 0.012 
Job-Skilled 0.161*** 0.010 0.151*** 0.010  0.142*** 0.011 
Agriculture     -0.244*** 0.028 
Construction     -0.025 0.017 
Wholesale     -0.074*** 0.015 
Hotels     -0.251*** 0.032 
Transport      0.053*** 0.017 
Finance      0.203*** 0.025 
Real estate     -0.091*** 0.020 
Education      0.075*** 0.016 
Public administration      0.076*** 0.013 
Health and social work      0.037** 0.015 
Other sectors     -0.082*** 0.016 
Densely populated area   0.078*** 0.011 0.097*** 0.011  0.033*** 0.010 
Intermediate area   0.034*** 0.010 0.037*** 0.010  0.010 0.010 
North East      -0.013 0.010 
Centre     -0.025** 0.010 
South     -0.099*** 0.012 
Islands     -0.089*** 0.018 
       
No. of observations                                                            14699 14699  14697  
R-squared                                                                           0.360 0.374  0.427  
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Different from the results of Day and Devlin (1998) and Hackl et al. (2007), household size has a 
negative effect on wage, statistically significant at 5 percent, while the numbers of children aged 
between 0 and 15 years old have a positive effect on labour income. As in Prouteau and Wolff 
(2006) and in studies following Mincerian approach (Di Pietro 2007), working in big firms and in 
professional/skilled occupations results in a higher income.  
 Finally, the coefficients on territorial dummy variables, which are included to capture any 
macro-regional specific differences in labour income, are consistent with the pattern of regional 
differences in Italy. 
Table 3 presents the estimates for OLS wage function (equation 3) with selection correlations on 
labour force participation3. We find that the coefficient on λ1 is statistically significant (1%) and 
negative in the three regressions (Column (1) – (3)). This means that there is an overestimation of 
the wage premium, if we do not correct for labour market participation. Indeed, in Column (1), we 
can observe that when we correct for selectivity problem the size of the coefficient on the voluntary 
work decreases, from 0.029 in Table 2 to 0.022 in Table 3, and the coefficient on this variable is no 
longer statistically significant. On the other hand, in all Columns, the results for the other 
explanatory variables are stable and unchanged relative to those reported in Table 2.  
In Table 4 the Instrumental Variable method is used to account for the endogeneity bias. Let us 
consider the selection term first. In all Columns, the coefficient on λ1 is still statistically significant 
at 1 percent with the negative sign. These results corroborate the relevance to account for the 
selectivity bias related to the labour market participation. Moreover, the coefficient on the voluntary 
work dummy variable increases its value and it is statistically significant at 1 percent as we control 
for endogeneity bias. Remarkably, the bias leads to underestimation of the absolute size of the 
coefficient of interest. As expected, voluntary work has a positive effect on labour income. The 
estimate in Column (3) shows that the wage premium of volunteering is 3.7 percent. The findings 
for the other explanatory variables are stable and unchanged compared to those reported in Table 3. 
 
 
                                                           
3
 The estimates of the selection equation for labour market participation are shown in Appendix B, Table B1. 
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Table 3. Ordinary least-squares estimates of the effect of volunteering on labour income with inverse Mills ratio 
Note. The symbols ***, **, * denote that the coefficient is statistically different from zero at the 1, 5 and 10 percent. 
  
                  (1)                   (2)               (3)  
 Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff.  SE 
Voluntary work 0.022 0.015 0.009 0.015 -0.011 0.014 
Male 0.138*** 0.010 0.162*** 0.010  0.172*** 0.010 
Married 0.065*** 0.010 0.064*** 0.010  0.055*** 0.010 
Separated 0.030 0.029 0.041 0.029  0.031 0.028 
Divorced 0.023 0.023 0.030 0.023  0.030 0.022 
Widowed 0.118*** 0.029 0.092*** 0.028  0.074*** 0.027 
Age 0.007*** 0.001 0.007*** 0.001  0.008*** 0.001 
Low secondary edu -0.076*** 0.012 0.114*** 0.020  0.082*** 0.019 
Upper secondary edu -0.026*** 0.009 0.204*** 0.021  0.146*** 0.020 
Post secondary edu   0.192*** 0.024  0.126*** 0.024 
University edu   0.380*** 0.025  0.286*** 0.024 
Household size -0.014*** 0.004 -0.014*** 0.004 -0.011*** 0.004 
Children 0 - 2  0.040*** 0.013 0.041** 0.013  0.032*** 0.012 
Children 3 - 5  0.029** 0.012 0.041*** 0.012  0.043*** 0.012 
Children 6 - 15   0.022*** 0.007 0.027*** 0.007  0.029*** 0.007 
Children 16 - 24 -0.009 0.007 -0.013* 0.007 -0.011 0.007 
Good health -0.003 0.009 0.007 0.009  0.017** 0.009 
Homeowner  0.095*** 0.009 0.083*** 0.009  0.061*** 0.009 
Weakly hours 0.017*** 0.001 0.017*** 0.001  0.017*** 0.001 
Labour experience 0.005*** 0.001 0.007*** 0.001  0.005*** 0.001 
Permanent contract 0.391*** 0.016 0.389*** 0.016  0.339*** 0.016 
Firm size       
> 10 and < 20 employees      0.068*** 0.011 
> 19 and < 50 employees      0.131*** 0.012 
.> 49 employees       0.166*** 0.010 
Job-Professional 0.292*** 0.011 0.229*** 0.012  0.209*** 0.012 
Job-Skilled 0.151*** 0.010 0.126*** 0.010  0.144*** 0.011 
Agriculture     -0.244*** 0.028 
Construction     -0.023 0.017 
Wholesale     -0.073*** 0.014 
Hotels     -0.249*** 0.032 
Transport       0.052*** 0.017 
Finance       0.203*** 0.026 
Real estate     -0.091*** 0.020 
Education       0.077*** 0.016 
Public administration       0.076*** 0.013 
Health and social work       0.037** 0.015 
Other sectors      -0.082*** 0.016 
Densely populated area   0.097*** 0.011 0.079*** 0.011   0.043*** 0.010 
Intermediate area   0.037*** 0.010 0.031*** 0.010   0.013 0.010 
North East       -0.014 0.010 
Centre      -0.021** 0.010 
South      -0.082*** 0.013 
Islands      -0.068*** 0.018 
λ1 -0.233*** 0.014 -0.139*** 0.015  -0.091*** 0.016 
 
    
 
 
No. of observations                                                                  14699  14699 
0.387 
14697 
0.428 R-squared                                                                                  0.374  
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Table 4. IV estimates of the effect of voluntary work on labour income with inverse Mills ratio  
 
Note. The symbols ***, **, * denote coefficient statistically different from zero at the 1, 5 and 10 percent. 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variable Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
Voluntary work 0.054*** 0.014 0.044*** 0.014  0.037*** 0.014 
Male 0.137*** 0.010 0.161*** 0.010  0.169*** 0.010 
Married 0.069*** 0.010 0.067*** 0.010  0.057*** 0.010 
Separated 0.032 0.029 0.042 0.029  0.033 0.028 
Divorced 0.030 0.023 0.037 0.023  0.036 0.022 
Widowed 0.128*** 0.029 0.100*** 0.029  0.080*** 0.027 
Age 0.007*** 0.001 0.007*** 0.001  0.008*** 0.001 
Low secondary edu -0.064*** 0.012 0.104*** 0.020  0.075*** 0.019 
Upper secondary edu -0.021** 0.010 0.185*** 0.021  0.132*** 0.020 
Post secondary edu   0.166*** 0.026  0.106*** 0.025 
University edu   0.350*** 0.026  0.264*** 0.025 
Household size -0.012*** 0.004 -0.013*** 0.004 -0.010** 0.004 
Children 0 - 2 0.046*** 0.013 0.047*** 0.013  0.038*** 0.013 
Children 3 - 5 0.030** 0.012 0.042*** 0.012  0.045*** 0.012 
Children 6 - 15  0.019*** 0.007 0.025*** 0.007  0.028*** 0.007 
Children 16 - 24 -0.011 0.007 -0.014** 0.007 -0.012 0.007 
Good health -0.000 0.009 0.010 0.009  0.020** 0.009 
Homeowner 0.087*** 0.010 0.077*** 0.010  0.056*** 0.009 
Weakly hours 0.017*** 0.001 0.017*** 0.001  0.017*** 0.001 
Labour experience 0.005*** 0.001 0.007*** 0.001  0.005*** 0.001 
Permanent contract 0.389*** 0.016 0.388*** 0.016  0.340*** 0.016 
Firm size       
> 10 and < 20 employees      0.069*** 0.011 
> 19 and < 50 employees      0.130*** 0.012 
> 49 employees       0.163*** 0.010 
Job-Professional 0.277*** 0.012 0.222*** 0.012  0.204*** 0.012 
Job-Skilled 0.143*** 0.011 0.123*** 0.010  0.141*** 0.011 
Agriculture     -0.228*** 0.029 
Construction     -0.017 0.017 
Wholesale     -0.069*** 0.015 
Hotels     -0.253*** 0.032 
Transport       0.049*** 0.017 
Finance       0.199*** 0.026 
Real estate     -0.079*** 0.020 
Education       0.072*** 0.016 
Public administration       0.075*** 0.013 
Health and social work       0.027* 0.016 
Other sectors      -0.090*** 0.016 
Densely populated area 0.107*** 0.011 0.088*** 0.011   0.051*** 0.011 
Intermediate area 0.043*** 0.010 0.036*** 0.010   0.018* 0.010 
North East       -0.019* 0.010 
Centre      -0.018* 0.010 
South      -0.078*** 0.013 
Islands      -0.063*** 0.019 
λ1 -0.234*** 0.014 -0.140*** 0.015  -0.092*** 0.016 
       
No. of observations                          14699                                             14699                                             14697 
R-squared                                          0.374                                              0.387                                             0.429 
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In order to check the strength of the instrumental dummy variables, we run the following test: we 
regress, through a probit model, the voluntary work dummy variable on religious or other groups 
participation dummy variable, informal help dummy variable and all other exogenous variables 
from the structural equation. The coefficients on the instrumental variables are significantly 
different from zero at the level of 1 percent (p-values 0.00 and 0.00) with positive signs in all 
Columns (see Appendix B, Table B2). The chi-square statistics for joint significance of the 
instruments are, respectively, 391.29, 380.43 and 372.13.  
We also test the correlation between our instrumental variables and voluntary work using the F-
test suggested by Staiger and Stock (1997). The F-statistic for joint significance of the instruments 
in the first stage of the endogenous variable on the instruments and all other exogenous variables is 
135, 57 in Column (1), 132.30 in Column (2) and 130.16 in Column (3), well above the threshold of 
10 suggested by Staiger and Stock (1997). Thus, we can conclude that our instrumental dummy 
variables are not weak. 
The validity condition is indirectly checked using a Sargan test. The residuals from the IV 
estimate are regressed on the instrumental dummy variables and all other exogenous variables. The 
R-squared is extremely small in all regressions (0.00000019, 0.00000007 and 0.00004068) 
indicating that the instruments do not explain any significant variations in the residual, suggesting 
the validity of at least one instrument. 
Finally, we also run a Hausman test in order to test the endogeneity of voluntary work dummy 
variable. The check is performed by including the residuals of the voluntary work equation in the 
OLS wage equation. A F-statistic on whether the coefficient on residuals is statistically significant 
indicates the endogeneity of voluntary work dummy variable. The result shows that the F-statistic in 
IV estimate is high (respectively, 12.57, 9.07 and 8.09) suggesting that voluntary work dummy 
variable is endogenous. 
6. Discussion 
Using a sample of Italian employees from the 2006 European Union Statistics on Income and 
Living Conditions (EU-SILC) dataset, this paper tries to answer to three questions about wage 
premium for volunteers: the existence of a wage premium, its size and the channel through which 
volunteering determines higher wages.  
Previous analyses prove that volunteers earn higher income compared to non-volunteers, also 
without considering self-selection and endogeneity bias. The present analysis shows that by using a 
wide set of variables the wage premium disappears in the basic estimates of Table 2. The wage 
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premium emerges when unobserved heterogeneity is taken into account. These results highlight that 
three problems must be taken into account when analyzing the returns to volunteering: the need for 
wide sets of variables, the unobserved worker heterogeneity and the reverse causality between 
volunteering and income.  
The size of the wage premium is important to assess the relevance of the investment motives in 
volunteering. Previous studies found wage premium ranging from 7 to 18,5 percent. This paper 
proves that the size of the wage premium is influenced by the selectivity bias related to the labour 
force participation. The overestimation effect of not considering the selection bias emerges when 
comparing Column (1) in Table 2 and Table 3. When considering selection bias problem and 
endogeneity issue, the estimate in Column (3) of Table 4 shows that the wage premium of 
volunteering is 3.7 percent, which is a very low premium, compared to previous analyses. This 
result is supported by the findings of Bruno and Fiorillo (2012), underlying that in volunteers’ 
behaviour the consumption motive prevails on the investment motive, relatively less strong in 
determining choices. Though a selectivity bias can explain the distance with the 7% premium of 
Day and Devlin (1997), further analyses are needed to explain larger variability across countries.  
As in Day and Devlin (1998), while showing the existence of a wage premium, we are not able 
to discern among the three different channels of influence of volunteering on income.   
The human capital hypothesis underlines that volunteers acquire skills and experience and 
become more productive. The wage premium for volunteering is the effect of this human capital 
accumulation. The best predictor for human capital effects of volunteering would be the past 
experience in volunteer activities: a significant effect of past experience should support the efficacy 
of this channel. Unfortunately, the EU-SILC data set doesn’t contain information on past 
volunteering. The labour experience variable is significant as expected, confirming the human 
capital accumulation through labour market work.  
The second channel of influence of volunteering on wages underlines that volunteering may 
influence earnings by providing a signal to employers of otherwise unobservable abilities (the 
screening hypothesis). This hypothesis implies that the wage premium is associated to unobservable 
characteristics, which individual signals to the employer through volunteering.  Hackl et al. (2007) 
found in their data that a problem of self-selection of volunteers exists, indirectly strengthening the 
screening hypothesis, but their analysis doesn’t control for self-selection in labour market 
participation. It is easily arguable that the choice to participate to the labour market is prior to the 
choice to volunteer in order to obtain a signalling effect and a higher remuneration in the labour 
market. We run a Chow test to verify the pooling hypothesis between volunteers and non-volunteers: 
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the pooling hypothesis is accepted, implying that volunteers do not differ statistically from non-
volunteers. This result should reduce the relevance of the screening hypothesis.  
Through the third channel volunteering may provide access to informal networks of contacts (the 
networking hypothesis). Prouteau and Wolff (2004) underline a relational motive to explain 
participation and volunteering in associations. Two possible relationships between volunteering and 
social networks emerge: individuals volunteer to acquire useful networks, providing chances to 
better jobs (instrumental relations), but individuals may also participate to associations and 
networks in order to consume relational goods (intrinsically enjoyed relations) and consequently 
find the chance to volunteer. Beyond the relational motive, it is reasonable that many persons 
volunteer when they are requested to do so (Freeman, 1997), and this is likely to happen in religious, 
environmental, civic and cultural associations. In the IV approach we find the significance of 
religious or other groups participation dummy variable on the voluntary work dummy variable. This 
supports the networking motive for volunteering, also if it does not exclude an instrumental use of 
networks for monetary purposes. 
7. Conclusion 
The effects of voluntary work on earnings have recently been studied for some developed 
countries such as Canada, France and Austria. This paper extended this line of research for Italy 
using data from the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) 
dataset. A double methodological approach is used in order to control for unobserved heterogeneity: 
Heckman and IV methods are employed to account for unobserved worker heterogeneity and 
endogeneity bias. 
Empirical results show that a wage premium of 3.7 percent of annual labour income emerges 
when the unobserved heterogeneity is taken into account. These findings indicate that a self-
selection correction for labour market participation should be used when estimating the pay 
differential between volunteers and non-volunteers. Furthermore, accounting for endogeneity bias, 
the results also indicate that the wage premium in Italy is quite small if compared to previous 
investigations on Canada and Austria. Future research on this last evidence is welcome in order to 
determine why this is the case. 
Finally, discussion about the three different channels of influence of volunteering on income is 
not conclusive. Some clues on the relevance of the networking hypothesis emerge from the 
empirical analysis, whereas the screening hypothesis is not confirmed.  
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Appendix A. Variable definitions 
 
 
 
Variable Description 
Dependent variable 
Labour income (ln) Natural log of annual net labour income 
Key independent variable 
Voluntary work Dummy, 1 if the respondent, during the last twelve months, participated in the unpaid work of 
charitable organizations, groups or clubs. It includes unpaid charitable work for churches, religious 
groups and humanitarian organizations. Attending meetings connected with these activities is 
included; 0 otherwise 
Sample selection and instrumental variables 
Social pension Dummy, 1 If the respondent, in 2005, perceived a social pension or a social allowance; 0 otherwise 
Disability pension Dummy, 1 If the respondent, in 2005, perceived a disability pension or a disability allowance; 0 
otherwise 
Civil disability pension Dummy, 1 If the respondent, in 2005, perceived a civil disability pension ; 0 otherwise 
Religious or other groups 
participation 
Dummy, 1 If the respondent, during the last twelve months, participated in activities related to 
churches, religious communions or associations or other groups (environmental organizations, civil 
right groups, neighborhood associations, peace groups, etc.); 0 otherwise 
Informal help Dummy, 1 if the respondent, during the last twelve months, undertook every week (private) voluntary 
activities to help someone, such as cooking for others; taking care of people in hospitals/at home; 
taking people for a walk. It excludes any activity that a respondent undertakes for his/her household, 
in his/her work or within voluntary organizations 
Demographic and socio-economic characteristics 
Male Dummy, 1 if male; 0 otherwise. Reference group: female 
Married Dummy, 1 if married; 0 otherwise;  Reference group: single status 
Separated Dummy, 1 if separated; 0 otherwise 
Divorced  Dummy, 1 if divorced; 0 otherwise 
Widowed Dummy, 1 if widowed; 0 otherwise 
Age Age of the respondent between 16 and 64  
Low secondary edu Dummy, 1 if the respondent has attained lower secondary school; 0 otherwise.  Reference group: No 
educational attained and primary school degree 
Upper secondary edu Dummy, 1 if the respondent has attained upper secondary school degree; 0 otherwise. 
Post secondary edu Dummy, 1 if the respondent has attained post secondary school degree; 0 otherwise. 
University  edu Dummy, 1 if the respondent has attained tertiary education or higher; 0 otherwise 
Household size  Number of household heads 
Children 0 -2 Number of own children ages 0 - 2 years old. Reference group: no children 
Children 3 -5 Number of own children ages 3 - 5 years old 
Children6 - 15 Number of own children ages 6 - 15 years old 
Children16 -24 Number of own children ages 16 and 24 attending school 
Good health Dummy, 1 if the respondent perceives his/her health as good or very good; 0 otherwise 
Homeowner Dummy, 1 if the respondent owns the house where he /she lives; 0 otherwise 
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Variable Description 
Worker characteristics 
Weekly hours Number of hours usually worked per week in main job 
Labour market 
experience 
Number of years, since starting the first regular job, that the respondent has spent at work 
Permanent job Dummy, 1 if the respondent has a work contract of unlimited duration; 0 otherwise 
Firm size  
> 10 and <20 employees Dummy, 1 if the number of persons working at the local unit is between 11 and 19; 0 otherwise.  
Reference group: = or  < 10 employees     
>19 and <50 employees Dummy, 1 if the number of persons working at the local unit is between 20 and 19; 0 otherwise.   
> 49 employees Dummy, 1 if the number of persons working at the local unit is equal or more than 50; 0 otherwise.   
Occupation  
Job-Professional Dummy, 1 if the respondent is employed in professional and/or managerial occupation; 0 otherwise;  
Reference group: Job-No skilled 
Job-Skilled Dummy, 1 if the respondent is employed in skilled occupation; 0 otherwise; 
Sector  
Agriculture Dummy, 1 if the activity sector is agriculture: 0 otherwise. Reference group: manufacturing 
Construction Dummy, 1 if the activity sector is construction: 0 otherwise 
Wholesale Dummy, 1 if the activity sector is wholesale and : 0 otherwise 
Hotels Dummy, 1 if the activity sector is hotels and restaurants: 0 otherwise 
Transport Dummy, 1 if the activity sector is transport: 0 otherwise 
Finance Dummy, 1 if the activity sector is finance intermediation: 0 otherwise 
Real Estate Dummy, 1 if the activity sector is real estate: 0 otherwise 
Education  Dummy, 1 if the activity sector is education: 0 otherwise 
Public administration Dummy, 1 if the activity sector is public administration: 0 otherwise 
Health and social work Dummy, 1 if the activity sector is health and social work: 0 otherwise 
Other sectors Dummy, 1 if the activity sector is another sector: 0 otherwise 
Territorial dummies 
Densely populated area Dummy, 1 it the respondent lives in local areas where the total population for the set is at least 50,000 
inhabitants. Reference group: Thinly-populated area 
Intermediate area Dummy, 1 it the respondent lives in local areas, not belonging to a densely-populated area, and either 
with a total population for the set of at least 50,000 inhabitants or adjacent to a densely-populated 
area. 
North East  Dummy, 1 if the respondent lives in North east regions; 0 otherwise.  Reference group: North West 
Centre Dummy, 1 if the respondent lives in Central regions; 0 otherwise 
South Dummy, 1 if the respondent lives in Southern regions; 0 otherwise 
Islands Dummy, 1 if the respondent lives in the Islands; 0 otherwise 
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Appendix B.  
Table B1. Labour force participation equation 
 
Note. The symbols ***, ** denote that the coefficient is statistically different from zero at the 1 and 5. 
 
Variable  Coeff.  SE 
Social pension -0.891*** 0.193 
Disability pension -0.821*** 0.075 
Civil disability pension -1.093*** 0.080 
Male 0.662*** 0.014 
Married -0.267*** 0.019 
Separated -0.061 0.055 
Divorced 0.007 0.055 
Widowed -0.564*** 0.039 
Age 30-39 1.279*** 0.023 
Age 40-49 1.564*** 0.023 
Age 50-59 1.227*** 0.022 
Age 60-64 0.209*** 0.032 
Low secondary edu 0.411*** 0.022 
Upper secondary edu 0.749*** 0.022 
Post secondary edu 1.037*** 0.035 
University edu 1.115*** 0.030 
Household size 0.020*** 0.008 
Children 0 - 2 0.051 0.033 
Children 3 - 5 0.116 0.030 
Children 6 - 15  0.002 0.014 
Children 16 - 24 -0.039*** 0.012 
Good health 0.332*** 0.016 
Homeowner -0.080*** 0.017 
Densely populated area -0.176*** 0.019 
Intermediate area -0.040** 0.018 
North East  0.011 0.021 
Centre -0.060*** 0.021 
South -0.326*** 0.022 
Islands -0.420*** 0.029 
  
No. of observations                                                                                             46338 
R-squared                                                                                                             0.341 
Log Likelihood                                                                                                 -20919.83 
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Table B2. Voluntary work equation 
 
Note. The symbols ***, **, * denote that the coefficient is statistically different from zero at the 1, 5 and 10 percent. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variable Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
Religious or other groups 
participation 0.444*** 0.047 0.437*** 0.047  0.573*** 0.034 
Informal help 0.568*** 0.034 0.563*** 0.034  0.418*** 0.048 
Male 0.037 0.035 0.035 0.035  0.079** 0.036 
Married -0.073*   0.043 -0.069   0.043  -0.057 0.044 
Separated -0.013 0.101 -0.015 0.101  -0.023 0.101 
Divorced -0.127 0.103 -0.125 0.103  -0.131 0.105 
Widowed -0.182 0.133 -0.157 0.134  -0.136 0.134 
Age -0.000 0.003 -0.000 0.003  0.001 0.003 
Low secondary edu -0.211*** 0.044 0.237*** 0.085  0.179** 0.086 
Upper secondary edu -0.083** 0.035 0.411*** 0.086  0.338*** 0.087 
Post secondary edu   0.541*** 0.095  0.451*** 0.097 
University edu   0.629*** 0.094  0.515*** 0.096 
Household size -0.042** 0.017 -0.039** 0.017 -0.030* 0.017 
Children 0 - 2 -0.098 0.063 -0.111* 0.063 -0.135** 0.063 
Children 3 - 5 -0.040 0.058 -0.041 0.059 -0.053 0.060 
Children 6 - 15  0.028 0.028 0.020 0.028  0.010 0.028 
Children 16 - 24 0.023 0.026 0.022 0.027  0.024 0.027 
Good health -0.049 0.036 -0.061* 0.036  -0.065* 0.037 
Homeowner 0.160*** 0.038 0.142*** 0.038  0.137*** 0.009 
Weakly hours -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.002  -0.000 0.002 
Labour experience 0.007** 0.003 0.010*** 0.003  0.007** 0.003 
Permanent contract 0.047 0.046 0.022 0.046  -0.020 0.048 
Firm size    
   
> 10 and < 20 employees    
 - 0.008 0.049 
> 19 and < 50 employees    
  0.048 0.050 
> 49 employees       0.080** 0.040 
Job-Professional 0.264*** 0.042 0.151*** 0.046  0.116** 0.049 
Job-Skilled 0.144*** 0.043 0.084* 0.044  0.080* 0.048 
Agriculture     -0.409*** 0.134 
Construction     -0.128 0.081 
Wholesale     -0.089 0.066 
Hotels       0.116 0.102 
Transport    
   0.095 0.075 
Finance    
   0.104 0.088 
Real estate    
 -0.289*** 0.089 
Education    
   0.101 0.067 
Public administration       0.020 0.061 
Health and social work       0.254*** 0.062 
Other sectors       0.205*** 0.062 
Densely populated area -0.157*** 0.041 -0.171*** 0.041  -0.185*** 0.042 
Intermediate area -0.096** 0.038 -0.103*** 0.038  -0.117*** 0.039 
North East        0.093** 0.043 
Centre      -0.082* 0.045 
South    
  -0.148*** 0.053 
Islands    
  -0.185*** 0.074 
       
No. of observations                        15163                                                      15163                                                  15157 
R-squared                                        0.071                                                      0.077                                                    0.091 
Log Likelihood                            -3984.22                                                  -3958.47                                              -3898.39                          
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